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Abstract—We describe TrustBase, an architecture that pro-
vides certificate-based authentication as an operating system ser-
vice. TrustBase enforces best practices for certificate validation for
all applications and transparently enables existing applications to
be strengthened against failures of the CA system. The TrustBase
system allows simple deployment of authentication systems that
harden the CA system. This enables system administrators, for
example, to require certificate revocation checks on all TLS
connections, or require STARTTLS for email servers that support
it. TrustBase is the first system that is able to secure all TLS
traffic, using an approach compatible with all operating systems.
We design and evaluate a prototype implementation of TrustBase
on Linux, evaluate its security, and demonstrate that it has
negligible overhead and universal compatibility with applications.
To demonstrate the utility of TrustBase, we have developed six
authentication services that strengthen certificate validation for
all applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Server authentication on the Internet currently relies on
the certificate authority (CA) system. While establishing a
secure SSL/TLS session with a server, clients receive a digital
certificate that vouches for the identity of the server. This
certificate is signed by a certificate authority, and the signature
is validated against a list of certificate authorities that is shipped
with the client or operating system. This provides assurance
that the client is connected to a legitimate server and not one
controlled by an attacker.
Unfortunately, certificate validation is challenged by three
significant problems:
• Applications frequently do not properly validate
the server’s certificate [20], [17], [6]. This is caused
by failure to use validation functions, incorrect usage
of libraries, and also developers who disable validation
during development and forget to enable it upon
release [18]. These implementation mistakes deceive
the user into believing her session is secure, while
leaving the application vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks.
• The CA system is vulnerable to being hijacked even
when applications are implemented correctly. This
is largely due to the fact that most CAs are able to
sign certificates for any host, reducing the strength of
the CA system to that of the weakest CA [12]. This
weakness was exploited in 2011 when DigiNotar’s
servers were hacked and more than 500 certificates
were fabricated by the intruder, including a certificate
for Gmail that allowed the intruder to access stored
email for 300,000 Iranians [27]. This happened despite
the fact that Gmail does not use DigiNotar to sign its
certificates. This problem is exacerbated by CAs that do
not follow best practices [34], [11] and governmental
ownership and access to CAs [13], [42].
• Improvements to the CA system have difficulty
being widely deployed. Protocols to enhance the
certificate validation process have been developed, but
the majority of applications have not yet integrated
these improvements. Even relatively simple fixes, such
as certificate revocation, are beset with problems [31].
There is no widely-adopted platform assisting the de-
ployment of improvements to the CA system, meaning
researchers and developers have to individually modify
applications to make advances, which severely limits
their deployment.
In this paper, we introduce TrustBase, an architecture for cer-
tificate authentication that solves each of these three problems.
TrustBase is designed to (1) secure existing applications, (2)
strengthen the CA system, and (3) provide simple deployment
of improved authentication systems.
To address these problems, TrustBase complements the
existing certificate validation performed by applications with
additional validation methods that are enforced by the operating
system. This approach has several advantages. First, it protects
against insecure applications—too much evidence shows that
developers make mistakes, and this will only get more diffi-
cult as additional authentication methods such as Certificate
Transparency [29], [41], pinning [16], [33], and DANE [22]
become more widely available. Second, it transparently enables
existing applications to be strengthened against failures of the
CA system. For example, a browser that validates the EV
cert of a bank is doing the best it currently can, but it is
still vulnerable to a CA that is hacked, allowing a man-in-the
middle (MITM) to present fake but valid certificates. TrustBase
provides complementary authentication services that protect
against these situations, such as checking notaries to ensure
other hosts across the Internet are seeing the same certificate
for the bank.1 Third, it enables a system administrator to ensure
best security practices are properly followed. TrustBase allows
the administrator for an organization to enforce consistent
1Certificates for a notary service can be pinned in advance, so they are not
vulnerable to the MITM.
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certificate validation across all applications, such as requiring
revocation checking or mandating that pinning is used to protect
against MITM attacks. TrustBase provides administrators with
a choice of authentication services that can be used to harden
the CA system.2
We identify a number of design goals for TrustBase,
including full application coverage, universal deployment, and
negligible overhead. To meet these goals, TrustBase uses
traffic interception between the socket layer and the transport
layer, an approach that is general enough to work on all
major operating systems, both desktop and mobile. TrustBase
detects the initiation of TLS connections, finds the handshake
information, validates the server’s certificate using a variety of
configurable authentication systems, and then allows or blocks
the connection based on the results of this additional validation.
This allows TrustBase to harden the certificate validation of all
applications, regardless of which libraries they use. For new or
modified applications, TrustBase provides a simple certificate
validation API that can be called directly.
Our contributions include:
• An architecture for enforcing best practices for
certificate validation on all applications: TrustBase
requires standard certificate validation procedures and
optionally adds additional authentication services, both
of which are enforced by the operating system and
controlled by the administrator. This repairs broken
validation for poorly-written applications and option-
ally strengthens the validation done by well-written
applications. Applications are allowed to be more strict,
but not less strict than TrustBase in their validation
decisions.
• Simplified deployment of authentication systems
that strengthen the CA system: TrustBase provides
a plugin API and a policy engine that dynamically
loads authentication systems based on administrator
preferences. They can be written in either C or Python,
with the ability to add support for additional languages.
The administrator can use policies to define how
multiple authentication systems cooperate, for example
using unanimous consent or threshold voting.
• A research prototype of TrustBase for Linux: We
develop a loadable kernel module that provides general
traffic interception and TLS handling for Linux. This
module communicates via the Netlink API to the policy
engine residing in user space for parsing and validation
of certificates. We describe how this same architecture
can be implemented on Windows, Mac OS X, iOS,
and Android devices.
• A security analysis of TrustBase: We provide a
security analysis of TrustBase, including its central-
ization, application coverage, and the hardening we
have done on the Linux implementation. We provide
a threat analysis and demonstrate how TrustBase can
thwart attacks that include a hacked CA, a subverted
local root store, and a STARTTLS downgrade attack.
2We expect TrustBase would be distributed with default settings by operating
system vendors so that ordinary users would not need to configure it, but
knowledgeable system administrators would be able to exercise greater control.
We also demonstrate the ability of TrustBase to fix
applications that do not validate hostnames or skip
certificate validation altogether.
• An evaluation of TrustBase: We evaluate the Trust-
Base prototype for performance, compatibility, and
utility. (1) We show that TrustBase has negligible
performance overhead, with no measurable impact on
latency. (2) We demonstrate that TrustBase enforces
correct certificate validation on all popular Linux
libraries and tools and on the most popular Android
applications. (3) We describe six authentication services
that we have developed and report on how simple and
straightforward it was to develop these services in
TrustBase.
II. RELATED WORK
The typical goal of an attacker who wishes to subvert TLS is
to perform a MITM attack on unsuspecting clients, substituting
his own certificate in place of the original. In this section we
discuss flawed implementations, weaknesses of the CA system
that make these attacks possible, and various alternatives to the
CA system that have been developed. We then discuss related
projects that try to address the problems affecting applications
and the CA system.
A. Flawed Implementations
Several studies demonstrate widespread vulnerabilities in
client-side validation of certificates, in both mobile and desktop
environments. Georgiev et al. [20] discovered that many
critical software applications outside the browser rely on
completely broken TLS validation libraries, primarily due to
poorly designed APIs. Brubaker et al. [6] conducted a large-
scale experiment of TLS implementations using millions of
“frankencerts”, random certificates generated from portions of
real certificates. They discovered hundreds of flaws in popular
TLS libraries and browsers. Fahl et al. [17] analyzed 13,500
popular Android apps and determined that 8% were vulnerable
to TLS MITM attacks. Lucky et al. [37] experimented with
100 popular Android apps and found that several accept all
certificates and all hostnames, along with other unsafe practices.
There is also evidence that servers are often incorrectly
setting up the certificate they send as part of the TLS handshake.
For example, Holz et al. [24] conducted a comprehensive
study and determined that invalid certificate chains, certificate
subjects, and self-signed certificates are the source of many
concerns. Additionally, Vratonjic et al. revealed that a minority
of the one million most popular web sites use certificates
properly [43].
B. Problems with the CA System
Clark and van Oorschot [7] provide an extensive survey
of work examining the CA system and found that the CA
system is surprisingly brittle. If these problems with the CA
system are not addressed, they will continue to allow malicious
individuals, governments, and others to intercept, decrypt, and
even modify TLS traffic. This could have drastic consequences
for user privacy, confidence in the safety of e-commerce, and
national security.
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Perhaps most troubling is that CAs are able to sign
certificates for any server. Mechanisms to restrict the signing
power of certificate authorities are, in practice, unused. For
example, Durumeric et al. [11] discovered that there are over
1,800 certificate authorities that can issue certificates for any
web site. CAs mismanage their private key and have been
hacked multiple times, leaving forged certificates in the hands
of the attackers [34]. Moreover, some governments, including
China and Russia, have their own CAs that are trusted by
all major browsers by default.There has been some recent
evidence that government institutions are coercing CAs into
providing certificates for use in surveillance [13], [42]. Finally,
some companies have been found to be using their position
as hardware vendors as a vector for secretly adding their own
certificates to devices and then performing TLS MITM on those
devices [35], [21].
C. Authentication Improvements
Due to these problems, there are a number of recent
proposals to improve or replace the current CA trust model.
(1) Multi-path probing such as Convergence [34] allows clients
to determine whether a server certificate they have received
is different from those seen by most other clients [44], [1],
[25]. Related systems use existing Certificate Authorities or
centralized notaries to vouch for the authenticity of a certificate
[15], [2], [3]. (2) DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) [22] enables administrators to bind hostnames to
their certificates, permitting public keys to be transmitted via
DNSSEC without involving a CA. (3) Certificate pinning [16],
[33] allows a web server to limit all future HTTPS connections
to a limited set of server certificates. (4) An audit log, such
as Certificate Transparency [29], [41] or the EFF Sovereign
Keys project [14], provides an additional path to validate server
certificates. The Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [28]
extends this notion to design a new infrastructure to validate
public keys and reduce the reliance on CAs.
D. Related Projects
Bates et al. created CertShim to address problems with
TLS authentication [5]. Similar to TrustBase, CertShim is an
attempt to immediately fix TLS problems in existing apps and
also support new authentication systems. CertShim works by
utilizing the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to replace
functions in dynamically-loaded security libraries with their
own wrappers for those functions. CertShim currently works in
Linux and supports applications that use OpenSSL, libNSS, and
older versions of GnuTLS and PolarSSL (with partial support
for Java SSE). Because CertShim relies on the LD_PRELOAD
variable, it doesn’t provide the level of administrator control
or full application coverage we prefer, and has significant code
maintenance issues. We discuss the detailed differences between
CertShim and TrustBase in Section VII.
Conti et al. created MITHYS to protect Android applications
from MITM attacks [8]. MITHYS employs a two stage
approach: first, it attempts to MITM applications that are
establishing TLS connections. If the MITM is unsuccessful,
MITHYS whitelists the app as secure and it will not attempt
to MITM this app in the future. If the MITM is successful,
MITHYS will MITM all future TLS connections by the applica-
tion. Next, the MITM service checks whatever certificate chain
it receives for the real TLS connection and checks it against a
notary service hosted in the cloud. If the chains do not match,
then MITHYS will stop the connection, thereby preventing
malicious MITM attacks. MITHYS only works for HTTPS
traffic, adds significant delays to all TLS connections that it
protects (one to ten seconds), and only supports the current CA
system. While additional authentication services could be added,
it would have a significant impact on performance because it
would be necessary to MITM all TLS connections.
Fahl et al. proposed a new framework for Android applica-
tions that would help developers correctly use TLS [18]. Their
work follows a similar principle as ours—instead of letting
developers implement their own TLS code, TLS is a service
provided by the operating system. Application configuration
files control TLS properties, including which authentication
systems are used and any parameters to those systems (e.g.,
which attributes to pin). Like TrustBase, their work uses
a pluggable framework for authentication schemes. Fahl’s
approach is well-suited to mobile operating systems such as
Android, where all applications are written in Java, but it
is difficult to extend this approach to operating systems that
provide more general programming language support. The
libtlssep library on Linux, provides similar capabilities to
Fahl’s work and also isolates authentication and session keys,
making it more difficult for them to be exposed due to a program
bug [4]. This approach provides good privilege separation, but
it does not offer protection for existing applications or force
adherence to administrator preferences.
III. TRUSTBASE
TrustBase is motivated by the need to (1) secure existing
applications, (2) strengthen the CA system, and (3) provide
an easy path to deploy alternative authentication systems. In
this section, we discuss the threat model, design goals, and
architecture of the system.
A. Threat Model
Our threat model includes an active attacker that imperson-
ates a remote host by providing a fake certificate during TLS
server authentication. This includes remote hosts as well as
MITM attackers located anywhere along the path to a remote
host. It also includes local malware impersonating a remote
host or attempting to subvert proper certificate validation. The
goal of the attacker is to establish a secure connection with
the client.
The application under attack may accept the fake certificate
for the following reasons:
• The application has incorrect certificate validation
procedures (e.g. limited or no validation) and the
attacker exploits his knowledge of this to trick the
application into accepting his fake certificate.
• The attacker or malware managed to place a rogue
certificate authority into the user’s root store (or
another trust store used by the application) so that
he has become a trusted certificate authority. The fake
certificate authority’s private key was then used to
generate the fake certificate used in the attack.
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Fig. 1. TrustBase architecture overview
• Non-privileged malware has altered or hooked security
libraries the application uses to force acceptance of
fake certificates (e.g. via malicious OpenSSL hooks
and LD PRELOAD).
• A legitimate Certificate Authority was compromised or
coerced into issuing the fake certificate to the attacker.
Local attackers (malware) with root privilege are outside
the scope of our threat model. Attacks against the TLS protocol
are also out of scope.
B. Design Goals
The design goals for TrustBase are:
1) Secure existing applications. TrustBase should over-
ride incorrect or absent certificate validation in current
applications.
2) Strengthen the CA system. TrustBase should permit
using multiple authentication services to strengthen
the validation provided by the CA system.
3) Provide simple deployment of authentication sys-
tems. TrustBase should facilitate the creation and
deployment of new authentication systems. Authentica-
tion systems should be easily developed and installed
without requiring recompilation of TrustBase.
4) Full application coverage. All certificates should be
validated by TrustBase, including those provided to
both existing applications and future applications.
5) Universal deployment. The TrustBase architecture
should be designed to work on any major operating
system including both desktop and mobile platforms.
6) Negligible overhead. TrustBase should have negligi-
ble performance overhead. This includes ensuring that
the user experience for applications is not affected,
and also that applications do not time out because of
the added overhead.
C. Architecture
The architecture for TrustBase is given in Figure 1. The
four principal components of TrustBase are:
• The traffic interceptor intercepts all network traffic
and delivers it to registered handlers for further
processing. The interceptor is generic, lightweight, and
can provide traffic to any type of handler.
• The handlers are state machines that examine a
traffic stream to isolate data used for authenticating
connections and then pass this data to the policy engine.
Data provided to the policy engine includes everything
from the relevent protocol that is intercepted.3 For ex-
ample, with TLS this includes the ClientHello and
ServerHello data, including the server certificate
chain and the server hostname. The handler will allow
or abort the connection, based on the policy engine’s
response.
• The policy engine is responsible for using the reg-
istered authentication system plugins to validate the
server certificate extracted by the handler. The policy
engine also aggregates validation responses if there are
multiple active authentication plugins. The results of
validation are sent back to the handler. The policy is
configured by the system administrator, with sensible
operating system defaults for ordinary users.
• The plugin API defines functions that must be im-
plemented by new authentication systems wishing to
operate as plugins. These plugins are provided with a
server certificate chain and other contextual data and
asked to validate the chain. TrustBase can dynamically
load new authentication plugins without alteration or
recompilation.
In addition to these main components, another module
delivers operating system notifications that indicate when an
application has been protected from an invalid certificate. An
API for the policy engine allows applications to be modified
to invoke TrustBase directly (see Section VII-C).
D. Traffic Interceptor
The traffic interceptor monitors all network connections
made by applications running on the system. The interceptor
is designed with the flexibility in mind, allowing for different
handlers to be registered that can view and modify the inter-
cepted traffic. This flexibility can also be used by researchers
who would like to leverage socket-level traffic interception for
purposes outside of TLS validation; for example, measuring
network traffic. Traffic for any specific stream is intercepted
only as long as a handler is interested in it. Otherwise, traffic
is routed normally.
The traffic interceptor is needed to provide immediate and
universal coverage for existing applications. If a developer is
willing to modify her application to call TrustBase directly for
certificate validation, then this can be avoided.
E. Handlers
Handlers are state machines that examine a traffic stream to
isolate data used for authenticating connections. TrustBase
currently has both a TLS and an opportunistic encryption
handler (e.g., STARTTLS), and due to the design of the traffic
interceptor it is easy to add support for new secure transport
protocols as they become popular (e.g., QUIC, DTLS).
The TLS handler identifies a TLS handshake and extracts
the ClientHello and ServerHello data, delivering all
of this data to the the policy engine, including the server’s
3This enables plugins to provide authentication methods that utilize TLS
hello extensions, such as TACK [33].
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hostname and certificate chain. Upon notification from the
policy engine, the TLS handler will abort any TLS connections
that do not have a valid certificate chain.
The TLS handler is a very simple state machine that
functions according to the following flow:
1) Detect the creation of a new TCP connection.
2) Determine whether the connection is attempting to
establish a TLS session. This detection is nearly
always completed based on the first received payload,
as TLS records have an easily recognizable header. If
the connection is not establishing a TLS session, stop
monitoring this connection.
3) Allow the client to send its ClientHello, and then
wait for the server to respond with its ServerHello
and Certificate messages. While waiting for the
server’s certificate, cache any packets the server sends,
and only forward these to the application after the
connection is authenticated.
4) Send the server’s host data (hostname, port, and IP
address) and captured TLS handshake message data
(including certificate chain) to the policy engine for
validation.
5) Based on the policy engine’s response, take
appropriate action:
POLICY_RESPONSE_INVALID: Receive a copy
of the certificate from the policy engine which has
its public key and signature scrambled, and then
forward it to the application. This will prevent the
application from establishing a TLS session even if the
application blindly accepts the certificate and allows
more verbose applications to display a relevant error
message. TrustBase also ensures that the connection
is terminated. When applications are modified
to call TrustBase directly, they can receive more
detailed error codes to display to the user. Operating
system notifications can be used to inform users
when applications are blocked by an invalid certificate.
POLICY_RESPONSE_VALID: Allow the connection
to continue and stop monitoring it.
The opportunistic encryption handler is also a simple state
machine, which identifies when TLS begins on an plainttext
connection and then hands the connection to the TLS handler
for additional processing. Both handlers are discussed in more
detail in Section IV.
F. Policy Engine
When the policy engine receives a validation request
from the TLS handler, it will query each of the registered
authentication system plugins to validate the server’s certificate
chain and host data. Authentication system plugins can respond
to this query in one of four ways:
• PLUGIN_RESPONSE_VALID: The plugin has deter-
mined that the certificate is valid for the given host.
• PLUGIN_RESPONSE_INVALID: The plugin has de-
termined that the certificate is not valid for the given
host.
• PLUGIN_RESPONSE_ABSTAIN: The plugin is un-
able to determine if the certificate is valid.
• PLUGIN_RESPONSE_ERROR: The plugin encoun-
tered an error. This is also used if the query to the
plugin times out.
Abstain and error responses are mapped to the valid or
invalid responses, as defined in a configuration file.
TrustBase classifies plugins as either “necessary” or “vot-
ing”, as defined in the configuration file. All plugins in the
“necessary” category must indicate the certificate is valid,
otherwise the policy engine will mark the certificate as invalid.
If the necessary plugins validate a certificate, the responses from
the remaining “voting” plugins are tallied. If the aggregation of
valid votes is above a preconfigured threshold, the certificate
is deemed valid by the policy engine.
The policy engine returns POLICY_RESPONSE_VALID
or POLICY_RESPONSE_INVALID as appropriate.
A write-protected configuration file lists the plugins to load,
assigns each plugin to an aggregation group (“necessary” or
“voting”), defines the timeout for plugins, etc.
G. Plugin API
TrustBase defines a robust plugin API that allows plugins
to be queried with host data and a certificate chain and then
return a response. For authentication systems to be used with
TrustBase, they must be implemented as plugins and conform
to the TrustBase plugin API. We provide both an asynchronous
plugin API and a synchronous plugin API to facilitate the needs
of different designs.
The synchronous plugin API is intended for use by simple
authentication methodologies. Plugins using this API may
optionally implement initialize and finalize functions
for any setup and cleanup it needs to perform. For example,
a plugin may want to store a cache or socket descriptor for
long-term use during runtime. Each plugin must also implement
a query function, which is passed a data object containing a
query ID, hostname, IP address, port, certificate chain, and other
relevant context. The certificate chain is provided to the plugin
DER encoded and in openssl’s STACK_OF(X509) format for
convenience. The query function returns the result of the
plugin’s validation of the query data (valid, invalid, abstain, or
error) back to the policy engine.
The asynchronous plugin API allows for easier integration
with more advanced designs, such as multithreaded and event-
driven architectures. This API supplies a callback function
through the initialize function that plugins must use to
report validation decisions, using the query ID supplied by
the data supplied to query. Thus the initialize function
is required so that plugins may obtain the callback pointer
(the finalize function is still optional). Asynchronous
plugins also implement the query function, but return a status
code from this function immediately and instead report their
validation decision using the supplied callback.
IV. LINUX IMPLEMENTATION
We have designed a research prototype implementation for
TrustBase in Linux. Source code is available upon request and
will be provided publicly in the near future.
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Fig. 2. Linux Traffic Interceptor simplified flowchart. Grey boxes correspond to hooks for handlers, white boxes are native system calls and kernel functions
Our implementation uses a novel loadable kernel module
(LKM) to intercept traffic at the application layer, as data
transits between the application and TCP. No modification of
native kernel code is required and the LKM can be loaded
and unloaded at runtime. Similarly to how Netfilter operates at
the IP layer, TrustBase can intercept traffic at the socket layer,
before data is delivered to TCP, and pass it to application-
level programs, where it can be (potentially) modified and
then passed back to the native kernel code for delivery to TCP.
Likewise, interception can occur when traffic arrives at TCP and
before it is delivered to the application. This enables TrustBase
to efficiently intercept TLS connections in the operating system
and validate certificates in the application layer.
The following discussion highlights the salient features of
our implementation.
A. Traffic Interceptor
TrustBase provides generic traffic interception, by capturing
traffic between sockets and the TCP protocol. This is done by
hooking several kernel functions, and wrapping them to add
traffic interception as needed. An overview of which functions
are hooked and how they are modified is given in Figure 2.
Items in white boxes on the left side of the figure are system
calls. Items in white boxes on the right side of the figure are
the wrapped kernel functions. The additional logic added to
the native flow of the kernel is shown by the arrows and gray
boxes in Figure 2.
When the TrustBase LKM is loaded, it hooks into the native
TCP kernel functions whose pointers are stored in the global
kernel structures tcp_prot (for IPv4) and tcpv6_prot
(for IPv6). When a user program invokes a system call to
create a socket, the function pointers within the corresponding
protocol structure are copied into the newly-created kernel
socket structure, allowing different protocols (TCP, UDP, TCP
over IPv6, etc.) to be invoked by the same common socket API.
The function pointers in the protocol structures correspond to
basic socket operations such as sending and receiving data, and
creating and closing connections. Application calls to read,
write, sendmsg, and other system calls on that socket then
use those protocol functions to carry out their operations within
the kernel. Note within the kernel, all socket-reading system
calls (read, recv, recvmsg, and recvmmsg) eventually
call the recvmsg function provided by the protocol structure.
The same is true for corresponding socket write system calls
eventually calling the provided sendmsg function. When the
LKM is unloaded, the original TCP functionality is restored in
a safe manner.
From top to bottom in Figure 2, the functionality of the
traffic interceptor is as follows. First, a call to connect
informs the handler that a new connection has been created,
and the handler can choose to intercept its traffic.
Second, when a call is made to send data on the socket,
the interceptor checks with the handler to determine if it is
tracking this connection. If so, it forwards the traffic to the
traffic handler for analysis, and the handler chooses what
data (potentially modified by the handler), if any, to relay
to TCP. After attempting to send data, the interceptor informs
the handler how much of that data was successfully placed into
the kernel’s send buffer and provides notification of any errors
that occurred. At this point the interceptor allows the handler
to send additional data, if desired. The interceptor then queries
the handler for the return values it wishes to report to the
application (such as how many bytes were successfully sent or
an error value). This value is then returned to the application.
Third, a similar, reversed process is followed for the
reception of data from the network. If the interceptor is tracking
the connection it can choose whether to receive data from TCP.
Any data received is reported to the handler, which can choose
whether to report a different value to the application. Note that
handlers are allowed to report arbitrary values to applications
for the amount of data sent or received, including false values, to
allow greater flexibility in connection handling. For example, to
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provide more time to obtain and parse an incomplete incoming
external response, a handler may indicate that it wants a non-
blocking application to believe that zero bytes of a prior query
were sent through the network, even though the full query may
have been sent. After the handler has completed its operation
it can report to a subsequent receive call from the application
that bytes were received, and fill the application’s provided
buffer with relevant data.
Finally, a call to close or shutdown informs the handler
that the connection is closed. Note that the handler may also
choose to abandon tracking of connections before this point.
Handlers for various network observation and modification
can be constructed by implementing a small number of
functions, which will be invoked by the traffic interceptor
at runtime. These functions roughly correspond to the grey
boxes in Figure 2. For example, handlers must implement
functions to receive data from applications, send data to TCP,
indicate whether to continue or cease tracking of a connection,
etc. The traffic interceptor calls these functions to provide the
handler with data, receive data from the handler to be forwarded
to applications or remote hosts, and other tasks. Such an
architecture allows developers to implement arbitrary protocol
handlers as simple finite state machines, as demonstrated by
the TLS handler and opportunistic TLS handlers described in
the succeeding subsection.
Another option for implementing traffic interception would
have been to use the Netfilter framework, but this is not an
optimal approach. TrustBase relies on parsing traffic at the
application layer, but Netfilter intercepts traffic at the IP layer.
For TrustBase to be implemented using Netfilter, TrustBase
would need to transform IP packets into application payloads.
This could be done either by implementing significant portions
of TCP, including out-of-order handling and associated buffers,
or passing traffic through the network stack twice, once to
parse the IP packets for TrustBase and once for forwarding the
traffic to the application. Both of these options are problematic,
creating development and performance overhead, respectively.
B. TLS Handler
TrustBase includes a handler for the traffic interceptor
dubbed the “TLS handler”. The TLS handler extracts certificates
from TLS network flows and forwards them to the policy engine
for validation. Figure 3 provides a high-level overview of how
this handler operates. When a new socket is created, the handler
creates state to track the connection, which the handler will have
access to for all subsequent interactions with the interceptor.
The destination IP address and port of the connection and
PID of the application owning the connection are provided to
the handler during connection establishment by the interceptor.
Since the handler is implemented in an LKM, the PID of the
socket can be used to obtain any further information about the
application such as the command used to run it, its location,
and even memory contents. The TLS handler understands the
TLS record and handshake protocols but does not perform
interpretations of contained data. This minimizes additions to
kernel-level code and allows ASN.1 and other parsing to be
done in userspace by the policy engine. When data is sent on
the socket, the handler checks state data to determine whether
the connection has initiated a TLS handshake. If so, then it
Fig. 3. Simplified view of TLS handler
expects to receive a ClientHello; the handler saves this
message for the policy engine so that it can obtain the hostname
of the desired remote host, if the message contains a Server
Name Indication (SNI) extension. If SNI is not used, we use a
log of applications’ DNS lookups to infer the intended host,4
similar to work by Bates et al. [5] When data is received on
the socket, the TLS handler waits until it has received the full
certificate chain, then it sends this chain and other data to the
policy engine for parsing and validation.
C. Opportunistic Encryption Handler
We have also implemented an opportunistic encryption han-
dler, which provides TrustBase support for plaintext protocols
that may choose to upgrade to TLS opportunistically, such
as STARTTLS. This handler performs passive monitoring of
plaintext protocols (e.g. SMTP), allowing network data to be
fast-tracked to and from the application and does not store
or aggressively process any transiting data. If at some point
the application requests to initiate a TLS connection with the
server (e.g. via a STARTTLS message), the handler processes
acknowledgments from the server and then delivers control of
the connection to the normal TLS handler, which is free to
handle the connection as if it were conducting regular TLS.
It should be noted that the use of opportunistic TLS
protocols by applications is subject to active attackers who
perform stripping attacks to make the client believe the server
does not support TLS upgrades, an existing vulnerability well
documented by recent work [10], [19], [23]. TrustBase can
prevent this type of attack, as discussed in Section V.
D. Policy Engine
The policy engine receives raw certificate data from the TLS
handler and then validates the certificates using the configured
authentication services. To avoid vulnerabilities that may arise
from performing parsing and modification of certificates in the
kernel, all such operations are carried out in user space by the
policy engine.
Communication between TrustBase kernel space and user
space components is conducted via Netlink, a robust and
efficient method of transferring data between kernel and user
4In practice, all popular TLS implementations now use SNI, and so this
fallback mechanism is almost never needed.
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space, provided natively by the Linux kernel. The policy
engine asynchronously handles requests from the kernel module,
freeing up the kernel threads to handle other connections while
a response is constructed.
Native plugins must be written in either C or C++ and
compiled as a shared object for use by the policy engine.
However, in addition to the plugin API TrustBase supports
an addon API that allows plugins to be written in additional
languages. Addons provide the code needed to interface between
the native C of the policy engine and the target language it
supports. We have implemented an addon to support the Python
language and have created several Python plugins.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The TrustBase architecture, prototype implementation, and
sample plugins have many implications for system security. In
this section we provide a security analysis of the centralized
system design, application coverage, protection of applications
from attackers, and protection of TrustBase itself from attackers.
A. Centralization
Concentrating all certificate validation for a host into an
operating system service has some risks and benefits. Any
vulnerability in the service has the potential to impact all
applications on the system. An exploit that grants an attacker
root permission leads to compromise of the host. An exploit that
causes a certificate to be rejected when it should be accepted is a
type of denial-of-service attack. We first note that if an attacker
is able to get TrustBase to accept a certificate when it should
not, any application that does its own certificate authentication
correctly will be unaffected. If the application is broken, the
TrustBase failure will not make the situation any worse than
it already was. The net effect is a lost opportunity to make it
better.
The risks of centralization are common to any operating
system service. However, centralization also has a compelling
upside. For instance, all of our collective effort can be centered
on making the design and implementation correct, and all
applications can benefit.5 A single service is more scalable
than requiring developers to secure each application or library
independently. It also enforces an administrator’s preferences
regardless of application behavior. Additionally, when a protocol
flaw is discovered, it can be more rapidly tested and patched
compared to having to patch a large number of applications.
B. Coverage
Since one of the goals of TrustBase is to enforce proper
certificate validation on all applications on a system, the traffic
interceptor is designed so that all TLS traffic on a system is
visible to it. Since the interceptor stands between the transport
and application layers of the OS, it can intercept and access
all TLS flows from local applications. The handlers associated
with the traffic interception component are made aware of a
connection when a connect call is issued and can associate
that connection with all data flowing through it. Applications
that utilize their own custom TCP/IP stack must utilize raw
5All applications would likewise benefit from caching among authentication
services.
sockets, which require administrator privileges and are therefore
implicitly trusted by TrustBase. Handlers can choose to read
or ignore data at any time, modify or pass through data at any
time, and continue or cease monitoring at any time.
To obtain complete coverage of TLS, our handlers need
only monitor initial TLS handshakes (standard TLS) and the
brief data preceding them (STARTTLS). The characteristics of
TLS renegotiation and session termination make this possible.
In TLS renegotiation, subsequent handshakes are encrypted
with the parameters set by the preceding handshake, which
depend on data from the certificate sent during that handshake.
Thus if the policy engine correctly authenticates and validates
the first handshake, TLS renegotiations are implicitly verified
as well. Attackers who obtained sufficient secrets to trigger a
renegotiation, through some other attack on the TLS protocol
or implementation (outside our threat model), have no need to
take advantage of renegotiation as they have complete visibility
and control over the connection already. We also note that
renegotiation is rare and typically used for client authentication
for an already authenticated server, and has become less relevant
for SGC or refreshing keys [39].
Session termination policies for TLS allow us to associate
each TLS session with only one TCP connection. In TLS, a
close notify must be immediately succeeded by a responding
close notification and a close down of the connection [9].
Subsequent reconnects to the target host for additional TLS
communication are detected by the TrustBase traffic interceptor
and presented to the handlers. We have found that TLS libraries
and applications do indeed terminate a TCP session when
ending a TLS session, although many of them fail to send
an explicit TLS close notification and rely solely on TCP
termination to notify the remote host of the session termination.
C. Threat Analysis
The coverage of TrustBase enables it to enforce both proper
and additional certificate validation procedures on TLS-using
applications. There are a variety of ways that attackers may try
perform a TLS MITM against these applications. A selection
of these methods and discussion of how TrustBase can protect
against them follows. For each, we verified our solution utilizing
an “attacker” machine acting as a MITM using sslsplit [40],
and a target “victim” machine running TrustBase. For some
scenarios, the victim machine was implanted with our own CA
in the distribution’s shipped trust store, or the store of a local
user or application. Applications tested utilize the tools and
libraries mentioned in sectionVI-B.
• Hacked or coerced Certificate Authorities: Attack-
ers who have received a valid certificate through
coercion, deception, or compromise of CAs are able to
subvert even proper CA validation. Under TrustBase,
administrators can choose to deploy pinning or notary
plugins, which can detect the mismatch between the
original and forged certificate, preventing the attacker
from initiating a connection. We have developed
plugins that perform these actions and verified that
they prevent such attacks.
• Local malicious root: Attackers utilizing certificates
that have been installed into an application or user
trusted store will be trusted by many target applications.
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Even Google Chrome will ignore certificate pins in the
presence of a certificate that links back to a locally-
installed root certificate. TrustBase can protect against
this by utilizing similar techniques to the preceding
scenario.
• Absence of status checking: Many applications still
do not check OCSP or Certificate Revocation Lists
to determine if a received certificate is valid [31]. In
these cases attackers utilizing stolen certificates that
have been reported can still perform a MITM. Admin-
istrators who want to prevent this from happening can
add an OCSP or CRL plugin to the policy engine and
ensure these checks for all applications on the machine.
We have developed an OCSP plugin and verified that
it performs status checks where applicable.
• Failure to validate hostnames: Some applications
properly validate signatures from a certificate back to a
trusted root but do not verify that the hostname matches
the one contained in the leaf certificate. This allows
attackers to utilize any valid certificate, including those
for hosts they legitimately control, to intercept [20].
The TrustBase policy engine strictly validates the
common name and all alternate names in a valid
certificate against the intended hostname of the target
host to eliminate this problem.
• Lack of validation: For applications that blindly
accept all certificates, attackers need only send a self-
signed certificate they generate on their own, or any
other for which they have the private key, to MITM a
connection. TrustBase prohibits this by default, as the
policy engine ensures the certificate has a proper chain
of signatures back to a trust anchor on the machine and
performs the hostname validation described previously.
• STARTTLS downgrade attack: Opportunistic TLS
begins with a plaintext connection. A downgrade attack
occurs when an active attacker suppresses STARTTLS-
related messages, tricking the endpoints into thinking
one or the other does not support STARTTLS. The net
result is a continuation of the plaintext connection and
possible sending of sensitive data (e.g., email) in the
clear. TrustBase mitigates this attack by an option to
enforce STARTTLS use. When STARTTLS is used to
communicate with a given service, TrustBase records
the host information. Future connections to that host
are then required to upgrade via STARTTLS. If the host
omits STARTTLS and prohibits its use, the connection
is severed by TrustBase to prevent leaking sensitive
information to a potential attacker.6
D. Hardening
The following design principles strengthen the security of
a TrustBase implementation. First, the traffic interceptor and
handler components run in kernel space. Their purpose is simple
and limited so that overhead will be negligible. The handlers are
implemented as finite state machines. Their small code size and
6This could be further strengthened by checking DANE records to determine
if the server supports STARTTLS. We are likewise interested in pursuing
whether this technique can be used to protect against other types of downgrade
attacks.
limited functionality make it more likely that formal methods
and source code auditing will provide greater assurance that
an implementation is correct. Second, the policy engine and
plugins run in user space. This is where error-prone tasks such
as certificate parsing and validation occur. The use of privilege
separation [38] and sandboxing [32] techniques can limit the
potential harm when any of these components is compromised.
Third, plugins can only be installed and configured by an
administrator, which prohibits unprivileged adversaries and
malware from installing malicious authentication services.
Finally, communications between the handlers, policy engine,
and plugins are authenticated to prevent local malware from
spoofing a certificate validation result.
TrustBase is designed to prevent a local, nonprivileged
user from inadvertently or intentionally compromising the
system. (1) Only privileged users can insert and remove the
TrustBase kernel module, prohibiting an attacker from simply
removing the module to bypass it. The same is true for
plugins. (2) The communication between the kernel module
component of TrustBase and the user space policy engine is
performed via a custom Generic Netlink protocol that protects
against nonprivileged users sending messages to the kernel.
The protocol defined takes advantage of the Generic Netlink
flag GENL ADMIN PERM, which enforces that selected
operations associated with the custom protocol can only be
invoked by processes that have administrative privileges for
networking (the capability mapped to CAP NET ADMIN in
Linux systems). This prevents a local attacker from using a
local netlink-utilizing process to masquerade as the policy
engine to the kernel. (3) The policy engine runs as a nonroot,
CAP NET ADMIN, chroot-jailed process that can be invoked
only by a privileged user. (4) The configuration files, plugin
directories, and binaries for TrustBase are write-protected to
prevent unauthorized modifications from nonprivileged users.
This protects against weakening of the configuration, disabling
of plugins, shutting down or replacing the policy engine, or
enabling of bogus plugins.
TrustBase aborts traffic interception for a given flow as soon
as it is identified as a non-TLS connection. Experimental results
show that TrustBase has negligible overhead with respect to
memory and time while tracking connections. Thus it is unlikely
that an attacker could perform a denial-of-service attack on
the machine by creating multiple network connections, TLS or
otherwise, any easier than in the non-TrustBase scenario. Such
an attack is more closely associated with connection firewall
policies.
An attacker may seek to compromise TrustBase by crafting
an artificial TLS handshake that results in some type of
validation failure, hoping to then subsequently launch a MITM
attack against an application. We attempt to shrink this possible
attack surface by performing no parsing in the kernel except for
TLS handshake records, which involves parsing nothing more
than message type, length, and version headers. ASN.1 and
other data sent to the policy engine are evaluated and parsed by
standard openssl functions, which have undergone widespread
scrutiny and use for many years. Thus it seems a very difficult
task to subvert TrustBase by careful crafting of TLS message
content. Despite this we submit that the current implementation
may not be foolproof in this respect and invite others to audit
the code, which has been made public. We note that while such
9
an attack still requires more effort than if TrustBase were not
present, the presence of TrustBase does not introduce additional
vulnerabilities that do not already exist. For example, the target
application must also improperly validate certificates for the
attack to be successful.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluated the prototype of TrustBase to measure its
performance, ensure compatibility with applications, and test
its utility for deploying authentication systems that can harden
certificate validation.
A. Performance
To measure the overhead incurred by TrustBase, we in-
strumented our implementation to record the time required
to establish a TCP connection, establish a TLS connection,
and transferring a file of varying size (2MB - 500 GB).
We tested TrustBase with two plugins, CA Validation and
Certificate Pinning (see Section VI-D). The target host for these
connections was a computer on the same local network as the
client machine, to reduce the effect of latency and network
noise. In addition, the host presented the client with a valid
certificate signed by an intermediate authority and finally a root
authority (DigiCert). This ensured that the CA Validation plugin
was forced to verify two certificates in the transmitted chain,
which is a realistic circumstance for modern web browsing. The
validity of the certificates also forced the plugins to execute all
of their checks, rather than breaking out early due to detected
problems. Our testing was performed on a PC running Fedora
21 64-bit (kernel 3.17) with an i7-4790K CPU and 16 GB of
RAM. Times were recorded from the perspective of a local
Python client application, using the time and ssl libraries.
Each measurement was performed 1,000 times.
Figure 4 shows boxplots that characterize the timing of TCP
and TLS handshakes, with and without TrustBase active. There
is no discernible difference for TCP handshake timings and
their average difference was less than 10 microseconds, with
neither average consistently beating the other in subsequent
experiments. This is expected behavior because the traffic
interceptor is extremely light-weight for TCP connections.
Average TLS handshake times under TrustBase and non-
TrustBase conditions also have an indiscernible difference, with
average handshake times for this experiment of 5.9 ms and
6.0 ms, respectively. Successive experiments showed again that
neither average consistently beat the other. This means that the
fluctuations of overhead incurred by kernel scheduling, network
conditions, etc. account for more time than the additional
control paths TrustBase brings. This is also expected, as the
brevity of TLS handling code, its place in the kernel, the use
of efficient Netlink transport and other design choices were
made with performance in mind. Since the latencies in these
experiments were from two machines on the same local network,
we can also expect that real-world connections would also have
no discernible overhead when running TrustBase. The local
network experiments allow to observe TrustBase latency in a
situation where its relative effect is maximized, rather than in
situations where distance, hops, network conditions, and other
factors account for the bulk of latency variations.
We also note that there was no additional difference
when transferring files of various sizes. This is intuitive since
Fig. 4. Handshake Timings for TCP (left) and TLS (right) handshakes with
and without TrustBase running.
TrustBase stops monitoring a connection once it has validated
(or invalidated) its certificate, which happens before the first
byte of data is sent. Note that the TrustBase timings for the
TLS handshake may increase if a particular plugin is installed
that requires more processing time or relies on Internet queries
to function.
The memory footprint in our prototype is also negligible.
For each network connection, TrustBase temporarily stores
only 212 bytes of data, plus the length of any TLS handshake
messages encountered. Connections not using TLS use even
less memory than this and carry a zero-byte memory overhead
once their nature has been determined and TrustBase ceases to
monitor them. This identification typically completes after the
first byte of data is sent from the application. All TrustBase-
allocated memory in the kernel for a TLS connection is freed
the moment the policy engine issues a decision and the traffic
interceptor takes appropriate action. Thus TrustBase on Linux
requires very little memory per connection and all memory is
usually freed within milliseconds of connection establishment,
if not sooner.
B. Compatibility
One goal of TrustBase is to strengthen certificate authen-
tication for existing, unmodified applications and to provide
additional authentication services that strengthen the CA system.
To meet this goal, TrustBase must be able to enforce proper
authentication behavior by applications, as defined by the
system administrator’s configuration. That is, applications are
allowed to be more strict, but not less strict than TrustBase
in their validation decisions. When the policy engine dictates
that a certificate is valid, the application is allowed to accept it
and proceed with a secure connection. When the policy engine
reports an invalid certificate, that connection should be aborted.
There are three possible cases for the policy engine to
consider. (1) If a certificate has been deemed valid by both
TrustBase and the application, the policy engine allows the
original certificate data to be forwarded on to the application,
where it is accepted naturally. (2) In the case where the appli-
cation wishes to block a connection, regardless of the decision
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Library Tool
C++ gnutls-cli
libcurl curl
libgnutls sslscan
libssl openssl s client
libnss openssl s time
JAVA lynx
SSLSocketFactory fetchmail
PERL firefox
socket::ssl chrome/chromium
PHP mpop
fsockopen w3m
php curl ncat
PYTHON wget
httplib steam
httplib2 thunderbird
pycurl kmail
pyOpenSSL pidgin
python ssl
urllib, urllib2, urllib3
requests
TABLE I. COMMON LINUX LIBRARIES AND TOOLS COMPATIBLE WITH
TRUSTBASE
by TrustBase, the policy engine allows this to occur, since
the application may have a valid reason to do so. We discuss
in Section VII-C, the special case when a new authentication
service is deployed that wishes to accept a certificate that
the CA system normally would not. (3) In the case where
validation with TrustBase fails, but the application would have
allowed the connection to proceed, the policy engine blocks
the connection by forwarding an intentionally invalid certificate
to the application, which triggers any relevant validation errors
an application may support, and then subsequently closes the
connection.
We tested TrustBase with 34 popular applications and
libraries and tools, shown in Table I.7 TrustBase successfully
intercepted and validated certificates for all of them. For each
library tested, and where applicable, we created sample applica-
tions that performed no validation and improper validation (bad
checking of signatures, hostnames, and validity dates). We then
verified that TrustBase correctly forced these applications to
reject false certificates despite those vulnerabilities. In addition,
we observed that TrustBase caused no adverse behavior, such
as timeouts, crashes, or unexpected errors.
C. Android Compatibility
To verify that the TrustBase approach is also compatible
with mobile applications, we built a prototype for Android. Our
Android implementation uses the VPNService so that it can
be installed on an unaltered OS and without root permissions.
The drawback of this choice is that only one VPN service
can be active on the Android at a time. In the long-term,
adding socket-level interception to the Android kernel would
be the right architectural choice, and then TrustBase could
use similar traffic interception techniques as with the Linux
implementation.
The primary engineering consequence of using the
VPNService is that TrustBase on Android intercepts IP
7These are a superset of the tools and libraries tested with CertShim
packets from applications but emits TCP (or UDP) packets
to the network. If it could use raw sockets, then sname
could merely transfer IP packets between the VPNService
and the remote server. Unfortunately, the lowest level socket
endpoint an Android developer can create is the Java Socket
or DatagramSocket, which encapsulate TCP and UDP
payloads respectively. Therefore, we must emulate IP, UDP and
TCP to facilitate communication between the VPNService
and the sockets used to communicate with remote hosts. For
TCP, this involves maintaining connection state, emulating
reliability, and setting appropriate flags (SYN, ACK, etc.) for
TCP traffic. Even with this requirement, overhead for TrustBase
on Android is also negligible.
To verify compatibility with mobile applications, we tested
16 of the most popular Android applications: Chrome, YouTube,
Pandora, GMail, Pinterest, Instagram, Facebook, Google Play
Store, Twitter, Snapchat, Amazon Shopping, Kik, Netflix,
Google Photos, Opera, and Dolphin. TrustBase on Android
successfully intercepted and strengthened certificate validation
for all of them.
D. Utility
To validate the utility of TrustBase, we implemented six
useful authentication services. We discuss each of these and
report statistics about their development. Times reported include
the time developers spent to understand the service to be
implemented.
1) CA Validation: The CA Validation service authenticates
a certificate using native openssl validation functions and
standard practices for validating hostnames, dates, etc. This
service enables TrustBase to enforce proper CA validation. In
addition, this service allows TrustBase to determine whether an
alternative authentication service will make a different choice
than the CA system, which is useful when overriding the CA
system (see the next section). Implementing this service in C
took approximately 12 hours and contains 310 lines of code,
including robust error handling.
2) Whitelist: The Whitelist service stores a set of certificates
that are always considered valid for their respective hosts. This
can be configured by administrators to bypass authentication
performed by other plugins, to speed up authentication for
commonly-used certificates. It also allows developers to deploy
self-signed dummy certificates during testing that will bypass
normal validation checks on the development machine instead
of hard-coding an exception in the application. Implementing
this service in C took approximately 2 hours and contains 128
lines of code.
3) Certificate Pinning: The Certificate Pinning service is
similar to the Whitelist service, but uses Trust On First Use
to pin certificates for any host. The certificate received on
subsequent visits to a host are checked against the certificate
stored in a database to see if the certificates match. Expired
certificates are replaced by the next certificate received by a
connection to that domain. This service could theoretically be
extended to support a more robust pinning scheme such as
TACK [33]. Implementing this service in C took approximately
5 hours and contains 132 lines of code.
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4) Certificate Revocation: The Certificate Revocation ser-
vice checks the OCSP extension on a certificate and, if present,
calls the OCSP service to check whether the certificate has
been revoked. A recent paper by Liu et. al. shows that 8% of
certificates have been revoked and that browsers often do not
bother to check revocation status [31]. This service enables
a user or organization to centralize and enforce certificate
revocation on all applications. To enforce revocation, the
TrustBase configuration file simply needs to list the revocation
service in the necessary group. Implementing this service in
Python took approximately 8 hours and contains 99 lines of
code.
5) DANE: The DANE service uses the DNS system to
distribute public keys in a TLSA record [22]. DANE enables
hosts to use self-signed certificates or to specify a particular
set of valid certificates, to strengthen the CA system against
unauthorized authorities signing a certificate without the host’s
permission. To implement this service, the plugin uses the
certificate chain, port, and hostname, which are then used to
perform a DNS query for the TLSA record. Implementing this
service in Python took approximately 8 hours and contains 56
lines of code.
6) Notary: The Notary service is based on ideas presented
by Perspectives [44] and Convergence [34]. It connects securely
to one or more notary servers to validate the certificate received
by the client is the same one that is seen by the notaries. This
can likewise be used to strengthen the CA system, or it can be
used to validate self-signed certificates. The service requires a
configuration file that lists known notary servers and pinned
certificates for each server. The client hashes the leaf certificate
for the connection in question and randomly chooses which
notary server to act as a proxy to perform all queries to other
known notary servers. The client then passes that notary the
host, port, and hash of the leaf certificate for the connection.
The notaries then respond with their validation verdicts, which
are forwarded to the client, where they tallied. Implementing
the client side of this service in Python took approximately 7
hours and contains 60 lines of (client) code.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss a number of additional issues
related to TrustBase and its portability to additional operating
systems, compatibility with certificate pinning, and ability to
override the CA system. We also provide a detailed comparison
of TrustBase to CertShim.
A. Operating System Support
We designed the TrustBase architecture so that it could
be implemented on additional operating systems. The main
component that may need to be customized for each operating
system is the traffic interception module. We are optimistic
that this is possible because the TCP/IP networking stack and
sockets are used by most operating systems.
On Windows the traffic interception module could use the
Windows Filtering Platform API. This could be used to create
a privileged, kernel-mode driver that intercepts traffic between
the TCP and application layers.
Mac OSX provides a native interface for traffic interception
between the TCP and socket levels of the operating system.
Apple’s Network Kernel Extensions suite provides a “Socket
Filter” API that could be used as the traffic interceptor.
For iOS, Apple provides a Network Extension framework
that includes a variety of APIs for different kinds of traffic
interception. The App Proxy Provider API allows developers
to create a custom transparent proxy that captures application
network data. Also available is the Filter Data Provider API that
allows examination of network data with built-in “pass/block”
functionality.
Because Android uses a variant of the Linux kernel, we
believe our Linux implementation could be ported to Android
with relative ease.
B. Certificate Pinning
Some applications have already begun to implement cer-
tificate pinning to provide greater security, rather than using
the CA system to validate a certificate. TrustBase wants to
avoid the situation where its authentication services declare
a certificate to be invalid when the application has validated
it with pinning. Our measurements indicate this is rare and
affects relatively few applications, since the problem only arises
when a certificate does not validate by the CA system (e.g. a
self-signed certificate shipped with the application). In the short
term, TrustBase solves this problem by using the configuration
file to whitelist programs that should skip using TrustBase. In
the long term, this problem is solved by applications migrating
to the TrustBase for validation, as discussed above.
C. Overriding the CA System
In some cases a system administrator may want to distrust
the CA system entirely and rely solely on alternative authentica-
tion services. For example, the administrator may want to allow
CA-using applications to accept self-signed certificates that have
been validated using a notary system such as Convergence, or
she may want to use DANE with trust anchors that differ from
those shipped with the system. When this occurs, TrustBase will
use the new authentication service and determine the certificate
is valid, but applications using the CA system will reject it,
and validation will fail. We stress that this is not intended to
override strong certificate checks done by a browser (e.g. when
talking to a bank), but to provide a path for migrating away
from the CA system when stronger alternatives emerge.
To handle these cases, TrustBase provides two options: (1)
migrating applications to TrustBase over the long term, and (2)
a local TLS proxy that can coerce existing applications to use
new authentication services. We describe both of these options
below.
1) Migrating Applications: The preferred option for over-
riding the CA system is to modify applications to rely on
TrustBase for certificate validation, rather than performing their
own checks. This is facilitated by an API that applications
can use to communicate with the TrustBase policy engine.
Applications can use the API to provide preferences and
additional data to TrustBase, such as requesting a self-signed
certificate to be pinned, if allowed by the administrator. The
API also allows the application to receive validation error
messages from TrustBase, allowing it to display errors directly
in the application (TrustBase displays notifications through
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the operating system). Deferring to TrustBase for certificate
validation means that the administrator can configure any
combination of authentication systems she prefers.
2) Proxying TLS Connections: An alternative option to
override the CA system is to use a local TLS proxy. TrustBase
gives the administrator the option of running a proxy, but only
in those cases where it is absolutely needed, namely when
the policy engine determines a certificate is valid but the CA
system would reject it. Note that in most cases this is not
needed—for example even with Convergence running today,
the certificates validated by Convergence would likely also
be validated by the CA system unless the certificate was self-
signed. When the policy engine dictates that a connection should
be proxied in this fashion, TrustBase transparently redirects
traffic to a user space, nonprivileged TLS proxy daemon, and
the daemon marshals traffic between the application and the
intended remote host. The application accepts the proxied
connection because the policy engine dynamically generates
a certificate that validates successfully against a TrustBase
CA certificate, which can optionally be placed in the system
trust store during installation. The root certificate is uniquely
generated (and periodically regenerated) locally and never
leaves the machine. Its corresponding private key is also not
readable by nonprivileged users. Administrators should only
use this feature if they are comfortable with the possibility of
some of their secure traffic being proxied locally.
D. Comparison to CertShim
Because CertShim also tries to secure existing applications
and introduce new authentication services, we provide a
detailed description of the differences here. CertShim uses
the LD_PRELOAD environment variable in Linux systems to
hook an application’s use of some system calls and various TLS-
related functions in common security libraries (e.g. openssl,
gnutls, libnss).
CertShim has an advantage over TrustBase in that it does
not need to perform double validation for cases where an
application is already performing certificate validation correctly.
While TrustBase can enforce proper and alternative validation
techniques, any protected applications that do this already will
do it a second time after TrustBase has validated the secure
connection. In addition, CertShim’s wrapping of validation
functions means that it can more easily override the CA system
when administrators want to do this for existing applications,
though this will only work with applications that CertShim
supports.
TrustBase has some advantages that set it apart from
CertShim in several notable ways:
1) Coverage: CertShim is not intended to protect browsers,
and it cannot perform validation for applications that use
a custom or unsupported security library, or have statically
linked any security library. In addition, it doesn’t work with
applications invoked by environment-passing exec functions
that use custom environments, despite the use of LD_PRELOAD
in the parent environment (e.g., /etc/environment, .bashrc).
In contrast, TrustBase intercepts all secure traffic and thus
can independently validate certificates for all applications,
regardless of what library they used, how they were compiled,
what user ran them, or how they were spawned.
2) Maintenance: Since each security library has a distinct
API, CertShim must be updated to support new libraries as
they are released. Moreover, CertShim must use data structures
internal to the security libraries it supports to obtain information
such as hostname or port that is not always passed to the
certificate validation functions. Libraries change their internals
with surprising frequency; the current versions of PolarSSL
(now mbed TLS) and GnuTLS are no longer compatible with
CertShim, one year after its release. Maintaining backward
compatibility with earlier library versions, and with different
versions supported by different OS releases, makes updates an
increasingly complex task.
Another complication for CertShim is that some applica-
tions use security libraries in a hybrid fashion. For example,
Chromium/Chrome uses a statically-linked version of its in-
house BoringSSL for TLS connections and crypto operations,
but libNSS is used for certificate validation. Similarly, Firefox
has migrated away from libNSS for certificate validation to a
statically-linked custom library (mozilla::pkix), but uses other
security libraries for crypto. To maintain compatibility with
hybrid approaches, CertShim would need to associate data from
one library with data from another, and this may be impossible
in cases involving static linking. In contrast, to validate all
certificates TrustBase only needs to maintain compatibility
with the TLS specification and the signatures of high-level
functions of TCP in the Linux kernel. As a datapoint, the latter
has had only two minor changes since Linux 2.2 (released
1999)—one change was to add a parameter, the other was to
remove it. TrustBase authentication services only need to call
the public API of security libraries, making them immune to
internal library changes.
3) Administrator Control: TrustBase adopts the philosophy
that system administrators should be in control of certificate
validation on machines, mirroring their responsibilities for other
security-related policies. Using a loadable kernel module to
intercept all secure traffic is in line with this philosophy—
only administrators may load or unload its functionality, and,
once loaded, every secure application is subject to the policies
configured for TrustBase. CertShim does not follow this
philosophy; guest users and applications can easily opt out of its
security policies. For example, guest users can remove CertShim
from their LD_PRELOAD environment variable, and developers
can bypass CertShim by statically-linking with security libraries,
using an unsupported TLS library, or spawning child processes
without CertShim in their environment.
4) Local Adversary Protection: CertShim’s attack model
does not assume a local adversary, wherein a nonprivileged,
local, malicious application attempts to bypass validation. This
can be done simply by modifying LD_PRELOAD—malware
commonly uses the same technique as CertShim [30]. TrustBase
mitigates such a scenario with its protected Netlink protocol,
privileged policy engine, protected files, and kernel module
that cannot be removed by a nonprivileged user. Recent studies
of TLS MITM behavior suggest that local malware acting as
a MITM is more prevalent than remote MITM attackers [26],
[36]. This suggests that protection against such malware is an
important part of certificate validation services.
5) STARTTLS Enforcement: Since CertShim hooks into
TLS library calls, it cannot be invoked in cases where TLS
is not present. The unique placement of TrustBase allows it
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to intercept connection data from both insecure and secure
traffic, allowing it to record what hosts offer opportunistic
STARTTLS services and recognize when a host suspiciously
omits that offer. This allows TrustBase to enforce STARTTLS
usage, significantly reducing the attack surface for downgrade
attacks.
6) Additional Context for Plugins: As alternative methods
of certificate validation become more diverse, they may need
to access additional data from a TLS context, including data
not normally associated with such connections. CertShim can
only access information passed to standard network functions
(such as connect, gethostbyname) and data from security
libraries. However, the position of TrustBase in the kernel
allows it to have an immense breadth of contextual data that
can be easily sent to the policy engine as additional information
for authentication services. This includes but is not limited
to a program’s name, path, permissions, owning user, socket
information, internal memory, etc.
VIII. CONCLUSION
TrustBase is able to secure existing applications, strengthen
the CA system, and provide simple deployment of new authenti-
cation services. By using traffic interception, we have developed
the first architecture that enables system administrators to ensure
correct certificate validation for all applications that use TLS,
on a wide variety of operating systems. Development and
deployment of improved authentication services is aided by a
policy engine, plugin API, and extensible support for additional
programming languages. We evaluated a research prototype for
TrustBase on Linux and demonstrated its negligible overhead
and compatibility with existing applications. To demonstrate
the utility of TrustBase, we have developed a variety of
authentication services with relatively little programming time
required. TrustBase is a boon for both system administrators
and researchers. Administrators can rest assured that all secure
connections are properly authenticated, and researchers can
easily deploy and test authentication services they design.
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